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IF THE NON-PERSON KING GETS No DUE PROCESS,
WILL INTERNATIONAL SHOE GET THE BOOT 9
JAMES COOPER-HILL
In Price v. Socialist People s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,I a terrorism suit
brought against Libya under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals became the first appellate court to unequivocally
hold that a foreign sovereign is not a person entitled to due process pursuant to the
Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 2 In order to weigh the import of the
holding, one must indulge m a two-pronged historical analysis, focusing first on
the concept of sovereign immunity and second, on the due process entitlement of
any entity, sovereign or otherwise. Of further interest is whether Price will affect
the benchmark case, International Shoe v. Washington,3 which established the
concept of minmunum contacts consistent with the traditional notions of fair play
and justice.
BRIEF HISTORY OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

The concept of sovereign immunity is said to stem from the quasi-theological
notion of the divine right of kings.4 It was held from the Middle Ages forward that
the King could do no wrong, although modem legal scholars differ on the exact
origin of sovereign immunity and whether it is truly based on the divine right of
kings.5 Sovereign immunity was supposedly imported to the United States by way
of the often cited Russell v. The Men of Devon.6 However, at least one court has
James Cooper-Hill, B.A., Univ. of Nev., M.B.A, Univ. of St. Thomas; J.D. Univ. of Denver; formerly
Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. of Dayton. Cooper-Hill was counsel for the plaintiffs in Daliberti v.
Republic of Iraq, Dadesho v. Government of Iraq (post judgment) and Price v. Socialist People's
Libyan Arab Jamahirya. He argued the Price case before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit.
1. Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82 (D.C. Cir. 2002) [hereinafter

PriceII].
2. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602-1611 (2004).
3. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
4. See Wilcox v. United States, 117 F Supp. 119-20 (S.D.N.Y 1953).

5. See Ryll v. Columbus Fireworks Display Co., Inc., 769 N.E.2d 372, 374, 378-379 (Ohio
2002); Butler v. Jordan, 750 N.E.2d 554, 558-59 (Ohio 2001); Hayes v. Cedar Grove, 30 S.E.2d 726,
728 (W Va. 1944).

6. Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788) (Numerous states have cited to
Russell v. Men of Devon in cases of first impression involving sovereign immunity including
Massachusetts (Hill v. City of Boston, 122 Mass. 344, 346 (Mass. 1877)), West Virginia (Long v. City

of Weirton, 214 S.E.2d 832, 851 (W Va. 1975)), Ohio (Bd. of Comm'rs of Hamilton County v.
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stressed that the first adoption of the Russell theory of immunity was misplaced.7
The United States has witnessed all three branches of its government
wrestling with the issue of foreign sovereign immunity The concept has evolved
over three distinct time penods. First, the U.S. Supreme Court accorded absolute
immunity to sovereigns in 1812.8 Second, in 1952, the U.S. Department of State,
on behalf of the Executive branch, imposed a system of qualified immunity 9 In
1976, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) laid out broad exceptions to
immunity as did further amendments in 1996.l° Under the concept of absolute
immunity noted by the U.S. Supreme Court in the early 19th century and later
during the period of qualified immunity the U.S. Department of State wielded the
power of the Executive branch."
At least in part, commercial activity in the United States conducted by foreign
sovereigns m direct competition with American private enterprise eroded absolute
immunity 12 That many foreign states engaged in quasi-private enterprise resulted
in the governmental-propnetary dichotomy that prevails at both the state and
federal level today '3 Commencing in 1952, the Tate Letter established a qualified
immunity that the Executive branch, acting through the State Department,
controlled. 14 During the twenty-four years of qualified immunity the Executive
branch was clearly in charge of and had apparent authority over the Judicial
branch.iS Qualified immunity was codified by the enactment of the FSIA in

Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109, 122 (Ohio 1857)) and Texas (City of Galveston v. Posnainsky, 62 Tex. 118
(Tex. 1884)).
7. Wilcox, 117 F Supp. at 119 (mistakenly basing sovereign immunity in the United States on
the maxim of the king: "Immunity of the sovereign from suit stemming from the political doctrine that
the King can do no wrong, had been transplanted and preserved inviolate as part of the American
common law until relatively recent times. Id.at 120). However, the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia in Hayes, 30 S.E.2d at 728, had earlier taken an opposite position.
8. Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 124 (1812).
9. Changed Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Governments,
Letter from Attorney General Legal Advisor, Jack B. Tate to Attorney General Philip B. Perlman, 26
Dept. State Bull. 984-85 (1952) available in Dunhill v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711-16 (1976)) [hereinafter
Tate Letter].
10. FSIA, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602-1611, as amended by the Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
11. See Tate Letter, supra note 9.
12. The governmental/proprietary dichotomy is based on the following distinction: an activity that
generates revenue in competition with private enterprise is subject to liability while an activity which is
mandated by law as a governmental service is immune. See OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., HANDBOOK
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 167 at 670 (2d ed. 2001). Note the commercial exception in the FSIA
in 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2).
13. See Thon v. Los Angeles, 21 Cal.Rptr. 398, 400 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (concluding that
fire-fighting is clearly governmental function); Byrnes v. Jackson, 105 So. 861, 863 (Miss. 1925)
(finding that operating a zoo is an implied governmental function.).
14. Tate Letter, supra note 9.
15. The position of the Department of State was accorded great weight by the court in Ocean
Transport Co. v. Gov.of the Republic of Ivory Coast, 269 F.Supp. 703, 704 (E.D.La. 1967) and other
cases discussed infra.
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1976.16 However, the FSIA was interpreted m such a way that no plaintiff
prevailed during the first four years of its enactment. 17 Even then, the first noncommercial plaintiff's verdict involved a car-bombing assassination in the District
of Columbia,18 eliminating the minimum contacts-due process issue from
consideration.
Similar acts of terrorism perpetrated upon U.S. citizens outside the United
States were not successfully prosecuted under the 1976 FSLA. 19 The only
plaintiff's judgment for what could be considered terrorism under the 1976 FSIA
can be attributed to the foreign sovereign's failure to timely seek to set aside a
default judgment.20 It took the enactment of the Anti Terrorism & Effective Death
Penalty Act of 199621 for the first plaintiffs to obtain judgments against a foreign
sovereign. 22 Even then, the basis for bringing such actions, and the trial court
exercising both subject matter and personal jurisdiction, was very limited. The
four criteria which established subject matter jurisdiction were: extrajudicial
killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, and torture.23 Even when horrendous acts
16. FSIA, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602, 1604.
17. See generally Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 506 F Supp. 981 (N.D.
III. 1980).(finding that government could not waive sovereign immunity based on FSIA waiver
provision because Iranian defendants still lacked mnimum contacts); Castro v. Saudi Arabia, 510 F
Supp. 309 (W.D. Tex. 1980) (finding that none of the exceptions in the FSIA operate to deprive Saudi
Arabia of sovereign immunity from suit in the United States); Carey v. Libyan Arab Republic, 453 F
Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (granting defendants' motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds based on
immunity provided under the FSIA).
18. See Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F Supp. 665, 673-74 (D.D.C. 1980).
19. See generally Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164 (D.C. Cir. 1994) [hereinafter
Cicippio 11] (granting defendant Iran's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for suit
involving U.S. citizens who were kidnapped in Beirut); Hall v. People's Republic of Iraq, 80 F.3d 558
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding district court correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction);
Pnncz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.D.C. 1994) (finding district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction over suit involving Americans kidnapped in Nazi Germany under either
retroactive application of the FSIA or pre-FSIA law of sovereign immunity).
20. Dadesho v. Gov't of Iraq, 139 F.3d 766, 767 (9th Cir. 1998).
21. Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214,
1241 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(7) (1996)) (allowing lawsuits against any nation
designated as a state sponsor of terrorism, even when the conduct took place outside the United States
and was perpetrated against a U.S. citizen).
22. Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F Supp. 1239, 1247 (S.D. Fla- 1997); see Daliberti v.
Republic of Iraq, 146 F Supp. 2d 19 (D.D.C. 2001) [hereinafter Daliberti I1]; Sutherland v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 151 F Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 2001); Higgins v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2000 WL
33674311 (D.D.C. 2000); Jenco v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 154 F Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 2001);
Simpson v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahmya, 180 F Supp. 2d 78 (D.D.C. 2001); Wagner v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F Supp. 2d 128 (D.D.C. 2001); Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
175 F Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2001); Hill v. Republic of Iraq, 175 F Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2001); Mousa
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 238 F Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2001); Boin v. Quramc Literacy Institute, 127
F Supp. 2d 1002 (N.D. II. 2001); Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 110 F Supp. 2d
10 (D.D.C. 2000); Elahl v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 124 F Supp. 2d 97 (D.D.C. 2000); Eisenfeld v.
Islamic Republic ofIran, 172 F Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2000); Anderson v. Islamic Republic ofIran, 90 F
Supp. 2d 107 (D.D.C. 2000); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998)
[hereinafter Flatow 1]; Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 18 F Supp. 2d 62 (D.D.C. 1998)
[hereinafter Cicippio111].
23. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C § 1605(aX7). See also Alejandre,
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of violence were inflicted upon U.S. citizens without justification, foreign
sovereigns pleaded "police brutality" and relied on a pre-1996 decision, Nelson v.
Saudi Arabia.24
Finally, in a logical opinion, a trial court held that a foreign sovereign was not
a person for purposes of due process, but then went on to consider the m mum
contacts analysis, suggesting that the diplomatic relations with the country in
question, Iran, were sufficient to find personal jurisdiction. 25 It was not until
Dalibertiv. Republic of Iraq26 that a contested case was brought before the court
and the issue of due process was raised. In Daliberti,after the denial of Iraq's
motion to dismiss, Iraq chose not to participate m the trial.27 Subsequently, in
Price et al v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,21 the due process issue
was raised by the defendant sovereign and addressed by the U.S. District Court.
The same court which had held that a foreign sovereign was not a person entitled
to due process m Flatow I,29 denied Libya's Rule 12 motion to dismiss, based in
pertinent part, on the due process argument. 30 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit became the first appellate court to hand down a
decision squarely facing the due process issue and ruling that a foreign sovereign
was not a person for purposes of due process. 31 This ruling was not appealed.
Given the mandatory venue of the U.S. District Courts for the District of Columbia
in terrorism suits brought pursuant to the FSIA, this decision should be the last
word on this issue. However, disingenuously Libya has raised this same issue
both in the remand to the district court,32 and in other similarly situated cases now
pending in the district court. A more detailed analysis of the Court of Appeals'
analysis in the Pricecase follows.
Russell v. Men of Devon and its Progeny Both Legitimate and Otherwise
Russell v. Men of Devon33 was cited by courts in the United States over 150
tunes before a federal statute adopting any concept of foreign immunity was
enacted. The Russell decision is a far better one on which to provide a foundation
for municipal government law than for crossing the Atlantic with a theory based on
the power of the King. Factually, the Russell decision is simple. A local bridge

966 F Supp. At 1247

24. See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 351 (1993).
25. Flatow/,999 F Supp. at 22.
26. Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F Supp. 2d 38,42 (D.D.C. 2000) [hereinafter Daliberti 1].

27. Daliberti II, 146 F Supp. 2d at 20.
28. Price v. People's Socialist Libyan Arab Jamahinya, 110 F Supp. 2d 10, 14-15 (D.D.C. 2000)
[hereinafter Price1].
29. Flatow 1, 999 F Supp. at 19.
30. Price II, 294 F.3d at 96-100
31. Id. at 96 (stating "with the issue directly before us, we hold that foreign states are not
'persons' protected by the Fifth Amendment.").
32. See Price v. People's Socialist Libyan Arab Jamahinya, 274 F Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2003)
[hereinafter PriceII1].
33. 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
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fell into disrepair resulting inthe plaintiff's wagon being damaged.34 Because
Devonshire had no fund with which to compensate the owner of the damaged
wagon, it was held immune from judgment. 35 Many of the subsequent citations in
American courts have opmed that Russell was the foundation for the concept of
sovereign immunity m the United States but have erroneously added the maxim
that the king can do no wrong, which does not appear in Russell.36 However, the
first case reciting the infallibility of the king in the newly formed United States
was handed down without mention of the Russell decision less than a month after
George Washington became the first president. The case of Benedict Calvert's
Lessee v. Sir Robert Eden3 7 resolved a knotty title and possession problem which
arose under a grant of the Province of Maryland from King Charles 1.38
The Court went to great lengths to stress the continued importance of the
English king's exercise of appellate jurisdiction as had been done since the earliest
days of the colonies.39 Of course, the exercise of appellate authority over land title
disputes by the King of England could hardly have continued longer,
notwithstanding the Maryland court's genuflection to the king in this case.
While Benedict Calvert's Lessee is the earliest case in the United States to
refer to the king being unable to commit a wrong, the first United States Supreme
Court decision regarding sovereign immunity was Chisholm v. Georga.40 In
Chisholm, it was argued that "until the time of Edward 1. the King might have been
sued in all actions as a common person.
but now none can have an action
against the King
,41 Justice Wilson finds that it is the people of the United
States who are the true sovereign and not the government or the State, thus
allowing the suit against Georgia to go forward.42
Two decades later the first American citation to the Russell case is found in
Riddle v. The Proprietorsof the Locks and Canals on Merrimack River 43 in which
no mention of the authority of the king is made. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts stated that while a county, referred to as a quasi corporation, can be
held liable on an indictment for neglect of a public duty, no private action can be
maintained, citing Russell as the settling authority. 44 A scant two years later,
Massachusetts again found that there was no liability for quasi corporations, in this

34. Russell, 100 Eng. Rep. at 362.
35. Id.
36. For example, see cases supra note 7.
37. Benedict Calvert's Lessee v. Sir Robert Eden, 2 H. & McH. 279 (Md. 1789).
38. Id.Inthe argument before the court: "The king cannot by his writ command himself
Id
at 290. Further argument was made: "A tenant in tail, making a feoffinent, discontinues the estate-tail.
But if the king, being tenant in tail, grants patent of the land, it does not operate as discontinuance,
being a wrong, for it is a maxim that the king can do no wrong. Id.at 3 10.
39. Id.at 334. The Court noted: "It has been the prevailing doctrine here that the lord proprietary,
like the king at home, cannot be disseised.
40. Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
41. Id at437.
42. Id.at 454.
43. Riddle v. Proprietors of the Locks and Canals on Merrimack River, 7 Mass. 169, 187 (1810).
44. Id. at 187.
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case the inhabitants of Leicester, absent a statute to that effect, citing Russell but
without any mention of the King.45
Countless cases for the next century and a half cited to Russell and many
others referenced the maxim, "the king can do no wrong."46 Often both were
joined together as if it were the king whose authority prevented the damaged
wagon's owner from recovery inRussell. Over time, the authority of the king has
been invoked in a democratic republic that, since its inception, has never had a
king.
Only a few decades after independence from the king, the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky found the theory of sovereign immunity more than simply a good idea. 7
Contrary to the conventional wisdom both before and after, however, that court
found that the king can indeed do wrong; it is just that when the king errs, he goes
unpunished:
[S]overeignty has a fictitious perfection and purity, which must be taken as real,
and which can not be controverted, and of course the abuse of its power can be
imputed to a sovereign, in restraint of its legitimate energies. The maxim, that
'the king can do no wronf' is not an idle device of royalty, formed to amuse or
beguile the multitude
The same court noted:
It is not, that the king, m a monarchy, or the people in a democracy can do no
wrong
it is the sovereignty with which they are invested, and in which they are
of error; and this capacity in the sovereign to err is
merged, that is incapable
4
matter of necessity.
Clearly, a difference of opinion existed just beneath the surface, with one
court stating that "[ilnimunity of the sovereign from suit stemming from the
political doctrine that the King can do no wrong, had been transplanted and
preserved inviolate as part of the American common law until relatively recent
the
times." 50 Note a pragmatic and different approach yet a decade earlier:
State should not be deprived or dispossessed of its property without its consent; not
the king can do no wrong, a maxim which
on the maxim of the English law that
''5
has no existence in American law. i
It took a twenty-first century Ohio court to provide the most thorough
historical analysis of both the American concept of sovereign immunity and the
reliance on the Russell case, although it overlooked the Riddle case as the initial
mention of Russell. The Ohio Supreme Court in Butler v. Jordan2 recited that the
45. Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9 Mass 247, 250 (Mass. 1812).
46. See supra notes 6-7.

47. See Commonwealth v. Morrison, 2 A.K. Marsh 75,93 (Ky. 1819).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Wilcox, 117 F Supp. at 119.

51. Hayes, 30 S.E.2d at 728-29.
52. Butler v. Jordan, 750 N.E.2d 554 (Ohio 2000).
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doctrine of sovereign immunity was associated with the English common-law
concept that "the King can do no wrong., 53 While that is not an accurate portrayal
of the first two American cases citing to Russell, the Ohio court did allude to the
analogy now found m the sovereign immunity privilege in the U.S. courts of
immunity extending to freedom from trial and not just from judgment. 4 In the
English feudal system, any lord of the manor who held his own lower level court
could not be brought into his own court." The king, being the highest authority,
likewise enjoyed such "protection on the theory that no court was above him."' 6
The Butler court explained m detail the Russell decision and concluded that
"[t]his rule of local government immunity then became the general American
rule." 57 Sovereign immunity in the Umted States was born starting with
government at the most local level. It quickly led to a higher level. Soon
thereafter, the same court stated that the concept of sovereign immunity had
evolved from the English common law concept that "the king can do no wrong"
and cited to Russell.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in deciding that sovereign immunity law of Nevada
5
was not applicable to a cause of action ansing in the State of California,
foreshadowed the coming conflict that would arise out of the passage of the 1996
FSIA Amendment. Mr. Justice Stevens speaking for the Court found that
sovereign immunity has two faces: "The doctrine of sovereign immunity is an
amalgam of two quite different concepts, one applicable to suits in the
59 sovereign's
own courts and the other to suits m the courts of another sovereign.,
The Absolute Immunity Period
The Absolute Immunity era began with the involvement of a foreign
sovereign, albeit not a king. The government involved was that of France and the
case condoned piracy on the high seas based on sovereign immunity 60 The year
was 1812 and the case The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.6 1 McFaddon and his
partner Greetham were the owners of the schooner Exchange that was forcibly and
violently taken from them by the French pursuant to orders from Napoleon.62 The
vessel, having been converted to a military vessel for France, encountered great
stress of weather and sailed into the port of Philadelphia for repairs.63 McFaddon
and Greetham filed suit for the vessel's return. 64 At the time the schooner sailed

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at564.
See id at566.
Id.at559.
Id.
Id.at560.
Nevada v. HaHl, 440 U.S. 410 (1978).
Id at414.
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, II U.S. 116 (1812).
Id at 116.
Id. at117.
Id
Id
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into port, a state of peace existed between France and the United States.65
McFaddon lost in the trial court but appealed to the Circuit Court of the United
States, which reversed and ordered the vessel returned to McFaddon and
Greetham. 66
Justice Marshall, m reversing the Court of Appeals, concluded m part: "It
seems then to the Court, to be a principle of public law, that national ships of war,
entering the port of a friendly power open for their reception, are to be considered
as exempted by the consent of that power from its jurisdiction., 67 Justice
Marshall's holding is that the vessel of a foreign sovereign entering a U.S. port in a
friendly manner during a time of peace should be exempt from the jurisdiction of a
United States Court. 68 This demonstrates a serious regard for a foreign sovereign
whose ownership of the vessel m question arose from piracy on the high seas. If
the Schooner McFaddon were put in the context of the 1996 FSIA amendment, and
if the French had treated the owners of the schooner accordingly the result might
have been different, provided that the ernng sovereign was designated a terrorist
state and thus amenable to an exception from immunity
The Tate Letter and QualifiedImmunityfrom 1952-1976
In 1952, there was a shift from absolute immunity In a letter issued by Jack
B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor at the U.S. Department of State, to Acting Attorney
General Philip B. Perlman, the State Department unilaterally purported to restrict
mimunity to governmental or public acts, thus creating a qualified sovereign
immunity 69 While the State Department's position was justified by the increase in
commercial activity by nations competing with private enterprise of the capitalist
countries, the letter itself clearly reflected an extension of power by the U.S.
Department of State. 70 The State Department's success m this regard was
enhanced by an abdication of Congressional power for twenty-four years and the
courts' acquiescence during the same period.
The Tate Letter required a foreign sovereign to seek a ruling of immunity
from the State Department, which in turn would file with the court in wuch that
sovereign had been sued, a "suggestion of immunity,, ' 7' not unlike a suggestion of
bankruptcy to stop judicial proceedings against one who has sought the protections
of the Bankruptcy Act. Courts differed in their reaction to the Tate Letter, but by

65. See id. at 118.
66. Id. at 117.
67. Id. at 145-146.
68. Id. at 147.
69. Tate Letter, supra note 9 (suggesting that immunity be recognized with regard to sovereign or
public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with regard to private acts (jure gestionis)); see also Pan
Am. Tankers Corp. v. Republic of Vietnam, 296 F Supp. 361, 363 (S.D.N.Y 1969) (applying

restrictive interpretation of sovereign immumty set forth in the Tate Letter).
70. See id Although Congress constrained State's authority by enacting the FSIA and its
subsequent amendments supranote 2, at 10, the State Dept. has been reluctant to cede authority.
71. See Pan Am. Tankers Corp., 296 F Supp. at 363.
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and large concurred with the authonty of State. 72 The courts' deferential attitude
towards the State Department was approved by the U.S. Supreme Court in
National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China.73 This attitude led to critical
commentary by noted legal scholar and jurist, Michael H. Cardozo. 74
The general attitude of the courts was that whatever suggestion was made by
the State Department, the courts lacked discretion to take a differing position. 75 A
trial court in the District of Columbia, in finding an absence of immunity noted:
"The State Department's determination that immunity need not be extended is
binding on 'this Court." 76 The appellate court m the same jurisdiction concluded:
"In delineating the scope of a doctrine designed to avert possible embarrassment to
the conduct of our foreign relations, the courts have quite naturally deferred to the
policy pronouncements of the State Department., 77 Another court, while finding
immunity, agreed with the process: Accordingly, both parties
agree that a
7
suggestion of immunity is conclusive and binding on the courts., 1
Other courts criticized the absence of criteria by which public acts could be
distinguished from private acts, whether by the courts or by the State Department,
but one court concluded that the suggestion or absence thereof of immunity by the
State Department was
"highly persuasive and the authorities dictate that it must be
79
given great weight.,
The Tate Letter differentiated the public acts of foreign governments, jure
imperin, from private acts, jurt gestionts.80 Similar differentiation has been
followed regarding the liability of state governments engaged in quasi or nongovernmental activity 81
That a foreign government should escape liability and even trial while
engaged in commerce and competing with non-government business entities is
hardly justified and seems to warrant inroads into absolute sovereign Immunity. It
seems questionable today that the interests of American business or U.S. citizens
72. See id
73. See Nat'l City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 360-61 (1955).
74. See generally Michael H. Cardozo, Judicial Deference to State Department Suggestions:
Recognition of Prerogative or Abdication to Usurper 48 CORNELL L.Q. 461, 498 (1963) (advocating
judicial deference to the State Department in foreign relations to present unified voice, not as abdication
ofjudiciary's responsibility but as recognition of the executive's prerogative).
75. Id
76. Amkor Corp. v. Bank of Korea, 298 F Supp. 143, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
77. Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimentos Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 358
(2d Cir. 1964).
78. Renchard v. Humphreys & Harding, Inc., 381 F Supp. 382, 383 (D. D.C. 1974).
79. Ocean Transp. Co. v. Gov't of the Republic of the Ivory Coast, 269 F Supp. 703, 705 (1967).
80. Tate Letter, supra note 9
81. See REYNOLDS, supra note 12, at 670. For an activity which is exclusively governmental in
nature, there is generally no liability for a tort which causes injury or damage to a person. Id
However, for an activity which is proprietary, such as the operation of business which competes with
private enterprise, there can be liability. Id. The difficulty arises in those cases which do not clearly
fall into one category or the other, such as garbage collection. Id.The distinction has been extended to
the federal law as applicable to foreign governments doing business. FS1A, 28 U.S.C.A. §1605(a)(2)
imposes liability on foreign sovereigns engaged m commerce.
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injured at the hand of foreign governments should be left to the State Department
instead of the judicial system. However, at least one court justified its deference
on the grounds of separation of powers:
Just as the Executive is not permitted, under the separation of powers, to interfere
with the Judiciary, so also the Judiciary should avoid any conflict with the
Executive in the field of international relations. The President, as the elected
representative of the people of the United8 2States, is the final word on the subject in
the absence of Congressional legislation.
The concept of separation of powers is a subject somewhat blurred today in
light of the position of the State Department regarding the 1996 amendments to the
FSIA and Congress' action permitting judgment creditors against foreign terrorist
states to have such judgments satisfied from the terrorist states' frozen assets. 3
One troublesome aspect of the theory of qualified immunity was the
diplomatic pressure brought to bear on the State Department for political
considerations." This resulted m the State Department issumg a "suggestion of
munmunity" which would ordinarily not be available in similar circumstances absent
the political considerations. 85 The other difficulty arose when foreign sovereigns
ignored litigation in U.S. courts. Absent a diplomatic note to the State Department
seeking a suggestion of immunity, it was left to the State Department to determine
whether immunity should be extended or not.s6 The two-branch approach in these
7
situations failed to establish consistent standards or uniformity of application.8
Litigation with ForeignSovereigns under the FSIA 1976-1996
In 1976, Congress codified the previous policy and eliminated the "suggestion
of immunity" procedure which the State Department had unplemented for twentyfour years. 88 This act of Congress clearly put the courts in charge instead of
having to yield to the dictates of the State89Department. For the first time, the bases
for immunity were established by statute.
The first case clearly worthy of the terronsm label resulted in a plaintiff's
verdict due to the fact that the event, a car bombing assassination, occurred within

82. Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A. and Republic of Cuba, 197 F Supp. 710, 724 (E.D. Va. 1961).
83. Price II, 294 F.3d at 99. In holding that a foreign State was not a person entitled to due
process, the appellate court referred to the frozen assets of such nations, which have long been the goal
of virtually all plaintiffs who filed suits based on terronsm after the 1996 Amendment to the FSIA. The
Price II court said: "For example, the power of Congress and the President to freeze the assets of
foreign nations, or to impose economic sanctions on them, could be challenged as deprivations of
property without due process of law. Id.
84. Verlinden B.V v. Cent. Bank of Nigena, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983)
85. Id.

86. See id.
87. Id. at 488.
88. See id.
89. FSIA, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602-1611.
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the District of Columbia.9" Chile's ambassador to the United States under the
Allende government, who was m disfavor with the usurping Pinochet regime, was
assassinated. 9
Although the judgment entered against the Republic of Chile was the first
under the FSIA for an act of terrorism before the 1996 amendment, it is less
significant in that during the qualified immunity period, it is unlikely that Chile
would have been afforded immunity for an act of assassination.
The important cases of this era are the ones involving American victims of
foreign terrorism that occurred outside the United States but that the courts
dismissed for lack of subject matter or personal jurisdiction. Some of these cases
returned for a second bite at the immunity apple after the enactment of the 1996
Amendment.92 Only one case reached judgment for an act of intended but
unsuccessful terronsm. 93 That judgment continued to accrue interest and became
one of but three judgments to receive satisfaction from Iraq's frozen assets upon
94
Others were resolved without
the commencement of the second war against Iraq.
96
95
pending.
still
further litigation, while some are
90. Letelier 488 F Supp. at 665.
91. See Vernon Loeb, Documents Link Chile Pinochet to Letelier Murder, WASHINGTON POST,
Nov. 14, 2000, at Ai6.
92. Joseph Cicippio's pre-1996 case was dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.
Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 1993 WL 730748, *3 (D.D.C. 1993) [hereinafter Cicippio Il].
However, it reached judgment in a later suit. Cicippio III, 18 F Supp. 2d at 70. Likewise, the disrmssal
of Chad Hall's 1992 suit was affirmed without opinion in Hall v. Iraq, 80 F.3d 558 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
Hall later became a successful plaintiff in Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 146 F Supp. 2d 19, 27 (D.D.C.
2001).
93. Dadesho v. Gov't of Iraq, 139 F.3d 766, 766-67 (9th Cir. 1998) (dismissing defendant's
appeal of judgment for plaintiff). Sargon Dadesho was the intended victim in hired assassination
case. After the assassin was apprehended and incarcerated, Dadesho filed suit in 1992 against the
Government of Iraq for plotting to murder him. Id at 766. A default judgment was entered in the
plaintiff's favor. Id. at 767. The court ruled that the plaintiff was not entitled to default judgment, but
granted judgment for plaintiff on one count of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id Iraq was
tardy in attempting to set aside the default. Id at 767 Dadesho was one of three judgments against Iraq
which were within the parameters of the President's Executive Order which confiscated Iraq's frozen
assets. See Exec. Order No. 13,290, 68 Fed. Reg. 14,307 § 1(b) (Mar. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Exec.
Order 13,290]. Dadesho, having levied on frozen bank account of Iraqi funds and qualified under the
exception spelled out in the Executive Order, was paid his judgment in full, $2,407,000 from Iraqi
funds controlled by the U.S. Treasury. Sargon Dadesho v. Government of Iraq; Garnishment in the
Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of New York, Execution with Notice to Garnishee,
based on a federal judgment in California, Action No. CV- 92-05491 -REC.
94. Exec. Order No. 13,290 at 14,307 § 1(b).
95. See Prncz v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 813 F Supp. 22 (D.D.C. 1992). Princz would not
have qualified as plaintiff after the 1996 amendment since his defendant was the Republic of
Germany, not terrorst nation. However, it was reported that Princz was ultimately paid a settlement
from the re-unified government of Germany.
96. See, e.g., Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahinya, 886 F Supp. 306 (E.D.N.Y.
1995), affd, 101 F.3d 239 (2d Cir 1991). The initial suit brought by the families of the victims of the
bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the bombing
having occurred in Scotland in 1988. Smith, 886 F Supp. at 315. However, after the passage of the
1996 amendment, the suit was re-filed as Rein v. People's Socialist Libyan Arab Jamahinya, 995 F
Supp. 325, 328 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), aff'd, 162 F3d 748 (2d Cir 1998).
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Litigation under the Anti Terrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
After the enactment of the Anti Terrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996, half a dozen cases reached judgment, all in cases against Iran, 97 except
Alejandre v. Cuba,98 known as the Brothers-to-theRescue case. In 2000, Congress
addressed the issue of satisfaction of these outstanding judgments with the passage
of what amounted to special legislation for a few victims of terronsm. 99 The act
provided for payment to judgment creditors of several judgments against Iran from
taxpayer funds although a subrogation clause provided that ultimately the
compensation would come from frozen Iranian assets.10° However, two suits
against Iran that had not reached judgment were also included so that when
judgment was entered in those suits, satisfaction was made. While mentioned m
the Conference Committee report, pending suits against Libya and Iraq received no
authorization for payment m the 2000 legislation. 101
THE EARLY DUE PROCESS CASES
The issue of due process arose with the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 10 2 Until that time, the only
issue of due process arose out of the Fifth Amendment, applicable only to the
federal government. 103 However, the Fourteenth Amendment extended this
requirement to all the States of the Union. 1 4 Given commerce across borders
among the citizens of the States, conflicts were inevitable. A resolution of these
conflicts and a system used for such resolution ultimately giving rise to such
phrases as "traditional notions of fair play and justice" and "substantial contacts"

97. See, e.g., Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 90 F Supp. 2d 107, 113-4 (D.D.C. 2000);
Cicippio III, i8 F Supp. 2d at 70; Flatow 1, 999 F Supp. at 34.
98. Alejandre v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F Supp. 1239 (S.D. Fla. 1997)
99. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat.
1464 (2000) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.).

100. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat.
1464, 1541 § 2002 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 8, 20, 22,27, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
101. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2002(b)-2. The Conference
Committee Report stated:
The Committee intends that this legislation will similarly help other pending and future
Antiterrorism Act plaintiffs as and when U.S. courts issue judgments against the foreign
state sponsors of specific terrorist acts. The Committee shares the particular interest of
the sponsors of this legislation in ensuring that the families of the victims of Pan Am
flight 103 should be able to collect damages promptly if they can demonstrate to the
satisfaction of a U.S. court that Libya is indeed responsible for that heinous bombing.
The Committee is similarly interested in pending suits against Iraq.
H.R. REP. No. 106-939 at 118 (2000).
102. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
103. U.S. CONST. amend. V
104. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
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05
Shoe v. State of Washington,1
arose primarily m three cases: International
07
Neff.
v.
Milliken v. Meyer 106and Pennoyer

The effectiveness of service by publication to establish in personam
jurisdiction arose in the Pennoyer case. 1" Pennoyer brought an action against Neff
in the state courts of Oregon and effected service by publication on the defendant
who was a California resident.i09 Neff failed to appear and the court entered a
default judgment resulting in an execution sale by the Oregon sheriff of land Neff
owned m Oregon." Neff subsequently brought suit to recover title to the land,
asserting his ownership based on a patent issued by the United States."' The
controlling issue was the effectiveness of a judgment based on obtaining personal
jurisdiction against a non-resident by publication of service."12
The Oregon statute provided that subject matter jurisdiction was established3
over a non-resident who owned property within Oregon through publication.1
Oregon law also provided for in rem jurisdiction if the subject matter was property
located within the State of Oregon. However, in rem jurisdiction was inapplicable
since the suit was brought in personam and the real property became involved in
post-judgment proceedings.' "4 The language of the opinion setting forth the
possibility of an Oregon court's jurisdiction over persons outside the temtory of
the State sovereign
is analogous to the process established by the 1996 FSIA
5
Amendment. "
In distinguishing between subject matter and personal jurisdiction, the
Pennoyer court relied on a Massachusetts decision, 116 one of the earliest to
distinguish the two types of jurisdiction. That case, Bissell v. Briggs,"7 required
both subject matter and personal jurisdiction m order to issue a judgment entitled
to full faith and credit in other states.ii8 The Pennoyer court adopted that same
simple prnciple." 9

105. Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
106. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
107. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
108. Id.at715.
109. Id.at714.
110. Id.Neff was sued in Oregon at time when he was resident of California. Id at 717 He
was served by publication and never given personal or actual notice. Id. at 716.
111. Id. at 715.
112. Id. at 720.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See id See also Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 221(a).
116. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 731.
117 Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462 (1 Tyng ) (Mass. 1813).
118. "In order to entitle the judgment rendered in any court of the UnitedStates to the full faith and
credit mentioned m the federal constitution, the court must have had jurisdiction, not only of the cause,
but of the parties. Id. at 468.
119. Pennoyer 95 U.S. at 731 (citing Bissell, 9 Mass. at 468-469) ("[ilt was held that over the
property within the State the court had junsdiction by the attachment, but had none over his person; and
that any determination of his liability, except so far as was necessary for the disposition of the property,
was invalid.").
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The conclusion that could be asserted by a foreign sovereign, relymg on the
Pennoyer case alone, is that the Constitution demands due process for its citizens,
thus precluding the exercise 120of authority over persons, or property, outside the
territory of the United States.
Following this logic, one must determine, ipso facto, that the 1996 FSIA
Amendment is unconstitutional.' 2' The escape from this inevitable conclusion is
the absence of status as a person, eliminating the need for due process.
Fourteenth Amendment due process based on service on a non-resident gave
rise to the phrase "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" in
Milliken v. Meyer 122 turmg on factual considerations and the adequacy of notice
given. That the defendant Meyer was personally served and received actual notice
of Wyoming proceedings while located in the State of Colorado gave hun the
opportunity to assert his defense in the Wyoming court. 123 The Court found that
its
Meyer had in fact been afforded due process and noted the difference between
24
holding and the earlier finding in Pennoyer based on service by publication.
Next, in the case of InternationalShoe, the Court distinguished Pennoyer and
said that previously, the presence of a defendant within the territory of the court's
jurisdiction was a prerequisite to a binding personal judgment. 125 However,
International Shoe did not require the physical presence of the defendant in the
certain
territory of the court's jurisdiction, but only that the defendant have
offend
suit
does
not
the
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of
26
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 1
Further, International Shoe extended the concept of the due process
requirement beyond humans to corporations without addressing the issue of who is

120. See id.
121. If a foreign sovereign is person requiring due process, it follows that it must have minimum
contacts for the U.S. Courts to have jurisdiction. Since the 1996 amendment to the FSIA provides for
junsdiction over foreign sovereigns for acts outside the United States in a setting which precludes any

contacts, then it follows that either the act is unconstitutional or the sovereign is not person entitled to
due process. It must be one or the other.
122. 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
123. The court said:
Its adequacy so far as due process is concerned is dependent on whether or not the form
is reasonably calculated to give him actual notice of
of substituted service provided
the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard. If it is, the traditional notions of fair

play and substantial justice implicit in due process are satisfied. Here there can be no
question on that score.
Id. at 463 (internal citation omitted).
124. Id.
125. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. See also Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733.
126. 326 U.S. at 3i6. Moreover, the court concluded:
But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of
summons or other form of notice, due process requires only that in order to subject
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
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a person for purposes of due process. The appellant, International Shoe Company,
was a Delaware corporation which had no office in Washington. 127 However,
during the pertinent time period, it did employ salesmen in Washington who were
merely order-takers. 28 All contracts for the purchase of merchandise were
consummated In Missoun.' 29 The merchandise was shipped f.o.b. from Missouri
to Washington so that the corporation
had no dominium over the merchandise once
1 30
it was delivered to the shipper.
The issue, ansing out of a suit to collect a portion of the commissions paid
pursuant to Washington's Unemployment Compensation Act,13 was whether
personal service on the salesmen m Washington and service by registered mail in
Missouri conferred personal jurisdiction of the Washington court over the
International Shoe, so that it was afforded due process. 132 Because International
Shoe's activities in Washington were neither casual nor irregular; and, because the
service by registered mail was reasonably calculated to give such defendant actual
1 33
notice, it could not be said that the corporation was not afforded due process.
The Court noted of the demands of due process:
Those demands may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the state of
the forum as make it reasonable, m the context of our federal system of
government, to require the- corporation to defend the particular suit which is
brought there. An "estimate of the inconveniences" which would result to the
corporation from a trial away from its "home" or principal place of business is
relevant in this connection.
The concept which evolved in Pennoyer Milliken, and International Shoe,
was logically extended in the FSIA substituting "direct effect" for minimum
contacts, thus enabling litigation in U.S. courts for conduct occurring wholly
outside the United States but perpetrated upon U.S. citizens. i35
The Early Non-Human PersonsAfforded Due Process
Until the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, due process existed only
in the context of the Fifth Amendment, limiting the focus to the federal
government. 136 International Shoe extended Fourteenth Amendment due process
37
arismg from State action to various entities other than corporations: partnerships,
127. Id.
128. Id. at 313-14.
129. Id. at 314.
130. Id.
131. Washington Unemployment Compensation Act, Wash. Rev. Stats., §§ 9998-103a-9998-123a,
(1941) (codified as amended at WASH. REV CODE § 50.24.010 (2004)).
132. 326 U.S. at 311-12.
133. The Corporation received due process so status as a person was not a deciding factor. Id. at
316.
134. Id. at317.
135. FSIA, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a)(2).
136. U.S. CONST. amend. V
137. Kaffenberger v. Kremer, 63 F Supp. 924,926 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
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mutual life insurance companies,' 38 and labor unions. 139 The issue of whether a
State of the Union was considered a person entitled to due process was raised when
South Carolina filed suit to avoid enforcement of recently passed civil rights laws.
Union is not Entitled to Due Process: Katzenbach v. South
A State of14the
0
Carolina
The case which acted as a benchmark for the Price decision was Katzenbach
v. South Carolina. South Carolina had brought suit against the Attorney General
to suppress enforcement of certain civil rights acts passed during 1964-1965.141
142
One basis for resisting enforcement of these acts was the denial of due process.
The Katzenbach decision squarely addressed the issue, holding that a State was not
a person for purposes of due process. 143 The case left little doubt that if a State of
the Union could not be a person for purposes of due process, then neither could a
foreign sovereign. 144
The Weltover Conflict
The next case to address the due process issue took a giant step backwards by
merely assuming that a foreign sovereign was in fact a person entitled to due
process.145 Making the due process assumption for a foreign sovereign would have
rendered the provisions of the 1996 FSIA Amendment unconstitutional, except for
acts that occurred within U.S. territory. This might have been the last word on this
issue but for a cryptic "but see" reference in the Weltover case, citing to
Katzenbach.'46
In Weltover the holders of bonds payable in dollars issued by the Republic of
Argentina's central bank, which extended the date of payment, brought suit against
the Republic of Argentina.147 Issuing government bonds sold in the United States
was considered a commercial activity, because Argentina was acting as a private
player and not as a regulator of the bond market.' 48 The unilateral extension of the
payment date by Argentina caused a "direct effect" in the United States, thus
creating jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).149 But did the statutory "direct
effect" equate to minimum contacts sufficient to satisfy traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice? Or was Argentina even required to be afforded due
process?
138. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541, 551(1948).
139. American Fed'n of Labor v. Watson, 60 F Supp. 1010 (1945).
140. Katzenbach v. South Carolina, 383 U.S. 301, 323-24 (1966).
141. Id. at307.
142. Id. at 323.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
146. Id. at 619.
147. Id. at 609.
148. Jd. at 620.
149. Id.
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The Court assumed, without deciding, that a foreign state was a person for
purposes of due process but side-stepped the issue by holding that the issuance of
bonds sold in the United States and paid m U.S. dollars amounted to sufficient
minimum contacts to satisfy the constitutional test.15 0 It is the reference to
Katzenbach which raised the issue by pointing out that States of the Union were
not persons for purposes of due process. This not only left the door open to a
finding that a foreign sovereign could not be a person for due process purposes, but
also it gave subsequent courts a road map for resolvmg these issues.
THE THREE CASES LEADING TO A DUE PROCESS RESOLUTION

Personal due process hardly created an issue m the context of the 1976 Act, in
that most cases were commercial m nature, thus creating either the mmnmum
contacts or direct effect m the United States. In non-commercial cases, until
Letelier there was a finding of no jurisdiction by the courts, so that due process
did not anse.' 51 However, in the context of the 1996 FSIA Amendment, due
process clearly became an issue for courts and commentators. The reaction was
154
152
to critical153 to indifferent.
wide and disparate, ranging from supportive
However, a series of three cases dealt with the issue.
55
The first, Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran,1
was unchallenged by the
defendant but the issue was raised sua sponte. In the second case, Dalibertiet al.
v. Republic oflraq,156 the defendant Republic of Iraq raised the issue in its Rule 12
motion to dismiss but abandoned its defense upon an unfavorable ruling and failed
to appeal. In the third such case, Price et al. v. Socialist People s Libyan Arab
Jamahtriya,157 the defendant not only asserted the absence of due process, but
appealed when the court denied its motion to dismiss on such grounds. Price
yielded the only appellate decision.

150. Id. at 619.
15i. Letelier, 488 F Supp. at672 n.6.
152. See Kevin Todd Shook, State Sponsors of Terrorism are Persons Too: The Flatow Mistake, 61
OHIO ST. L.J. 1301 (2000) (describing 1996 Amendment as compatible with due process based on
general jurisdiction and the reasonableness prong of the minimum contacts analysis); Lee M. Caplan,
The Constitution and Jurisdictionover Foreign States: The 1996 Amendment to the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act in Perspective, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 369, 420-22 (2001) (asserting that the 1996
amendment withstands constitutional scrutiny because minimum contacts should not control personal
jurisdiction over foreign states).
153. Keith Sealing, State Sponsors of Terrorism is Question, Not an Answer: The Terrorism
Amendment to the FSIA Makes Less Sense Now Than it did Before 9/11, 38 TEx. INT'L L.J. 119, 141

(2003) (cnticizlng the FSIA and arguing that foreign states are "persons" entitled to due process).
154. See Karen Halverson, Is Foreign State 'Person'? Does it Matter? PersonalJurisdiction,
Due Processand the ForeignSovereign Immunities Act, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 115, 142 (2001)
(arguing that junsdiction over foreign states should be analyzed not on due process grounds but under
international law).
155. Flatow 1,999 F Supp. I (D.D.C. 1998)
156. Daliberti1, 97 F Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2001).
157. Price11, 294 F.3d at 85.
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Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran
Since the 1996 FSIA Amendment, the issue has remained whether the foreign
sovereign defendant is a person for purposes of due process, raising the substantial
contacts factor. In order for a foreign sovereign to be exempt from traditional
immunity under the FSIA, that sovereign must be on the list of terrorist states. t s
Once on that list, diplomatic relations no longer exist with the country, with the
exception of Syria, thus limiting or eliminating contacts between that nation and
the United States. 59 If a foreign sovereign lacks the presumed substantial
contacts, how can that nation be subjected to trial, that which immunity avoids?
While two trial courts dealt with the issue more than peripherally, neither utilized a
finding that a foreign sovereign could not be a person for purposes of due process
as the basis for the court's ruling. 16° Further, it is a less onerous task for the court
to raise sua sponte the issue of due process in a matter being tried without the
presence of the defendant in the courtroom.
In the Flatow I case, Iran had never appeared and the matter was tried with no
defense whatsoever on its part. 6 1 The court, quite properly, conducted the trial as
if there were a defendant present, raising sua sponte those issues which required
resolution in order to enter a judgment. The court in Flatow I said that the U.S.
Supreme Court had only addressed the issue of due process for a foreign sovereign
twice, citing to both Verlindin162 and Weltoverl63 and in those cases only in
dicta. 164 Weltover the Flatow I court noted, particularly avoided the issue by- (1)
assuming without deciding that a foreign sovereign was a person for due process;
(2) finding minimum contacts sufficient to establish the due process requirement;
and (3) contradicting itself through the Katzenbach reference. 165
The Flatow III court then found it unnecessary, much like the court in
Weltover to base its decision on the non-person status of the foreign sovereign, but
gave a cogent discussion of the merger of subject matter jurisdiction and personal
66
jurisdiction and the confusion this has caused courts and legal scholars.'
Particularly, the Flatow 11I court did find a close resemblance between "minmum
by finding that m fact and in law due process had
contacts" and "direct effects"
67
been afforded to Iran.

It should be noted that while the Flatow III court gave a thoughtful and
thorough analysis of its many considerations, the argument was all raised sua
158, FSIA, 28 U.S.C.A_ § 1605(a)(7)(A).
159. Glenn Kessler, Powell to Detail Concerns to Syria; At Meeting Intended to Ease Tensions,
Secretary to Seek Specific Action, WASHINGTON POST, May 3,2003, at A14.
160. Flatow 11, 67 F Supp. 2d 535 (D. Md. 1999); Flatow II1,74 F Supp. 2d 18 (D.D.C. 1999).
161. Mona Conway, Terrorism, the Law and Politics as Usual: A Comparison of Anti-Terrorism
LegislationBefore andAfter 9/11, 18 TOURO L. REv 735, 743 n.46 (2002).
162. Verlinden B.V v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
163. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
164. Flatow III, 74 F Supp. 2d at 19-20.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 20-21.
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sponte, as Iran filed no pleadings and made no appearance whatsoever m the
Flatow III case.
Its importance is that itis the first post-1996 FSIA amendment
case in which personal due process is mentioned.169
Dalibertiv. Republic of Iraq
The next such case, Dalibertiv. Republic oflraq, went one step further in that
Iraq, as it had done in two previous FSIA cases, both pre-1996, sought dismissal
and vigorously contested the plaintiffs' assertions.170 Iraq had appeared by counsel
and had argued a motion to dismiss m Hall v. People s Republic oflraq'7' and had
appealed, without success, the entry of a default in Dadesho v. Government of
Iraq.172 However, once its motion to dismiss in Daliberti I had been denied, Iraq
abandoned
the courtroom, rendering the trial for all practical purposes a default
73
hearing. 1
Iraq sought dismissal on constitutional grounds m the Daliberti case,
including the denial of equal protection by treating state sponsors of terronsm
differently from other nations and by abrogating the mminimum contacts
requirements essential for personal junsdiction.174 It is the latter of these that is
germane to the appellate case of first impression and the question that decision
raises. 175 Iraq's motion to dismiss specifically alleged that because the behavior of
that which Plaintiffs complained occurred outside the United States, and within the
Republic of Iraq (as well as in Kuwait for at least one plaintiff), that the defendant
did not have fair warning that a particular activity would subject it to the

168. Conway, supranote 166, at 743 n.46.
169. See Flatow 1ff, 74 F Supp. 2d at 19.
170. 97 F Supp. 2d 38 (D. D.C. 2000).
171. 80 F.3d 558 (D.C. Cir..1996).
172. 139 F.3d 766 (9th Cir. 1998).
173. Judge Oberdorfer commented at the commencement of the DalibertiI trial:
I have been sensitive to the fact that-to the effect on the trial of there being no defense
counsel present. I've been tempted but haven't interjected what would be, in effect,
objections to leading questions and to the admission of what-if there were alert defense
counsel, they would probably be tested as to whether the evidence or the material was
hearsay. I'm toying with an idea. I want to mention it to you now so you may think
about it, of having you, maybe you've done it anyway, annotate your findings with
reference to the transcript or document that is the item of evidence which would when
you look at it as a lawyer you would believe conscientiously to be manifestly admissible.
Trial tr., at 273, Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2000). Judge
Oberdorfer also engaged trial counsel in a dialogue as if objections were made by an
opposing counsel and ruled upon: "Court: Now what would your objection be if you
were defense counsel to the admission?" Cooper-Hill: If I were the defense counsel I
would object on the basis of hearsay and if I were the Court I would overrule the
objection on the basis of business records. Court: You are a lawyer. What would you
answer? Cooper-Hill: It's a business record, your Honor, under 803 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Court: So I ratify
the Order reeiving it.
Trial tr., at 306, Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 97 F Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2000).
174. Daliberti,1,97 F Supp. 2d at 52.
175. See id.
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jurisdiction of the United States, citing Burger King. 17 6 Iraq further alleged that
maintenance of the DalibertiI suit would offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice, citing InternationalShoe. 177 When the testimony adduced at
trial demonstrated that one of the plaintiffs was stripped naked, blindfolded and
threatened with electrocution through his testicles if he did not sign a confession of
espionage,1 78 it is difficult to suggest that Iraq had no warning that such conduct
might subject it to the jurisdiction of an American court.
Judge Friedman, in denying Iraq's motion to dismiss, quoted from the
Congressional Report 79 on the 1976 enactment of the FSIA which equated the
conduct giving rise to subject matter jurisdiction with sufficient contacts. He went
on to state:
In the context of this statute, the purpose for which it was enacted, and the nature
of the activity toward which it was enacted, and the nature of the activity toward
which it is directed, the Court concludes that it is reasonable that foreign states be
held accountable in the courts of8 the
United States for terronst actions perpetrated
0
against U.S. Citizens anywhere.'
Further, m the opinion denying Iraq's motion to dismiss based on due process,
the judge m DalibertiI first cited to Flatow, Weltover and Katzenbach but stated:
"It would seem that a foreign sovereign should enjoy no greater due process rights
than the sovereign States of the Union. As Judge Richey noted: 'If the States of
the Union have no due process rights, then a "foreign mission" qua "foreign
mission" surely can have none."""il
Daliberti I was the first post-1996 FSIA Amendment case in which the
defendant sovereign raised the issue of due process; this makes Daliberti I the
second of the three case evolution on the due process issue. Notwithstanding that
the opinion in DalibertiIdenying Iraq's motion to dismiss was straightforward and
did not hesitate to hold Iraq to trial in a United States court, it still is but a trial
court opinion. It fell to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit to make the first appellate ruling as to the lack of due process being
afforded a foreign sovereign.

176. Id at 53 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)).
177. Daliberti1,97 F Supp. 2d at 53 (citing lnt' Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316).
178. Chad Hall: "He said to get started we'll pull your fingernails out. If that doesn't work we'll
cut your knuckles off one at time. Question: Cut your what? Your fingertips off one at a time? Chad
Hall: Yes. He said if that doesn't work. .(indicating). Question: What did he say9 Chad Hall: He said
we'll take an electric cord to you and shock you. Question: Shock you where? Chad Hall: In the
gonads. Question: In your testicles, correct? Chad Hall: Yes. in Tnal tr., at 121-122, Dalibeti v.
Republic of Iraq, 97 F Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2000).
179. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 13-14 (1976) (footnotes omitted), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604, 6612, quoted in Thos. P Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Produccion de Costa Rica, 614
F.2d 1247, 1255 n.5 (9th Cir. 1980).
180. Daliberti1, 97 F Supp. 2d at 54.
181. Id. at 49 (citing Palestine Information Office v. Shultz, 674 F Supp. 910, 919 (D.D.C. 1987)).
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Pricev. SocialistPeople s Libyan Arab Jamahirya
The PriceI case became the first post-1996 FSIA Amendment case in which
the defendant designated terronst state not only appeared by filing a motion to
dismiss, but also appealed the denial of such motion.1 2 After first reciting the
InternationalShoe criteria of certain minimum contacts, and in their absence, the
protection a person has from the burden of litigating in the forum m which suit has
been commenced, the Price I court first found that Libya has no
contacts,
83
minimum or otherwise, sufficient to satisfy due process requirements. 1
However, Libya's argument asserted that, as a matter of law, it was a person
for purposes of due process. 1 4 The court acknowledged having previously
proceeded as if this were true but had never so held. 18 5 The U.S. Supreme Court m
the Weltover case, as noted above, assumed without holding that Argentina was
entitled to due process, notwithstanding its cryptic footnote to Katzenbach, but did
not find due process lacking.' 8 6 The same court which decided Price had
previously stated that a foreign state being entitled to constitutional due process
was an unchallenged assumption in Creighton Ltd. V Government of Qatar187
But in Price H the issue of due process, as a means of challenging the personal
jurisdiction88over Libya, was placed squarely before the court and contested by the
1
plaintiffs.

Noting that prior decisions had danced around the issue both before and after
the Katzenbach case, the Price H court found nothing equivocal about its ruling
which could conceivably support Libya's position.' 89 The incongruity of holding a
State of the Union not a person entitled to due process but providing due process
comfort to a foreign state alien to our system of constitutional law was pointed
out. 190

Of all the compelling arguments the court put forth to justify the negative
finding regarding a foreign sovereign, the most significant in the context of an
FSIA suit brought for acts of terrorism was related to the practical problems arising
182. Price I, 110 F Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2000); aff'd Price11, 294 F.3d 82 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
183. Price I, 110 F Supp. 2d at 14 (noting that "Libya has no presence in the United States, does
not conduct any business in the United States either directly or through an agent, and has no other
affiliating contacts with the United States").
184. Price 1,294 F.3d at 95.
185. Id.
186. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 619.
187. 181 F.3d 118, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
188. Price 1, 294 F.3d at 85.
189. See id at 90. The Court of Appeals in Price acknowledged the absence of due process, if
applicable, by stating: "Thus, §1605(a)(7) now allows personal jurisdiction to be maintained over
defendants in circumstances that do not appear to satisfy the 'minimum contacts' requirement of the
Due Process Clause. Id.at 90. However, the Court of Appeals further stated that the term 'person' did
not include a sovereign, and, unequivocally denied the nght of due process to foreign sovereign:
"Indeed, we think it would be highly incongruous to afford greater Fifth Amendment rights to foreign
nations, who are entirely alien to our constitutional system, than are afforded to the states, who help
make up the very fabric of that system. ld. at 96.
190. PriceIl,
294 F.3d at 96, 99.
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from vesting a foreign state with such constitutional protections as Libya sought.19'
Foremost among these was the power of the executive branch to freeze the assets
of foreign nations or to impose sanctions upon them, thus giving rise to the
argument that such executive conduct deprived the foreign state of its property
without benefit of due process. 92 It should be noted that ultimately the issue of
granting U.S. courts jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns coincided inextricably
with the right to collect judgments from those frozen assets.
In an earlier draft of an FSIA amendment that never made it to the floor of the
senate, the sponsor Arlen Specter (R.-PA) testified that his then pending bill would
not only grant a forum but a means to satisfy any judgment awarded. 193 The form
of the FSIA under which Flatow, Daliberti and Price were brought included

language instructing the Secretaries of State and Treasury to use their best efforts
,,t94The
to "fully, promptly and effectively assist any judgment creditor
refusal to so do and the relentless resistance to be of any assistance to former
hostage judgment creditors resulted in additional litigation m the DalibertiI case
against those Secretaries in a mandamus action.' 95 This internal conflict was
resolved by two events involving the frozen assets of Iraq. First, the enactment of
the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 amended by the addition of the
Terrorism Victims Access to Compensation 96 clearly conferred upon judgment
creditors that right which had only been hinted at in committee reports and the
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. The Senator noted:
This legislation would amend the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act by giving Federal
courts junsdiction over any suit brought in this country against any foreign country that
supporter of international
has been formally listed by the State Department as
terrorism, if that foreign state has committed, caused, or supported an act of terrorism
against an American citizen. The legislation would also enable the court to freeze all
assets of the defendant country located within the United States sufficient to satisfy
judgment.
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Comm. on the Judiciary; for
Consideration on S. 825 S.Hrg. 103-1077 June 21, 1994 (statement of Senator Arlen Specter). While
approved by the committee, the bill was never brought to the floor of the Senate and thus died at the end
of the session in 1994.
194. FSIA, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1610(f)(2)(A). The FSIA sets out:
At the request of any party in whose favor a judgment has been issued with respect to
claim for which the foreign state is not immune under section 1605(a)(7), the Secretary
of the Treasury and the Secretary of State should make every effort to fully, promptly
and effectively assist any judgment creditor or any court that has issued any such
judgment in identifying, locating, and executing against the property of that foreign state
or any agency or instrumentality of such state.
FSIA, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1610(t)(2)(A).
195. When the Secretaries of State and Treasury refused to comply with the requirements of 28
U.S.C. 1605(a)(2), the plaintiffs in Daliberti, post-judgment, collectively filed Civil Action 02-CVI 120-(LFO) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Daliberti et al v. Colin L. Powell,
Secretary of State of the United States and Paul H. O'Neil, Secretary of Treasury of the United States, a
Petition for a Writ of Mandamus. The matter was continued on several occasions at the request of the
Department of Justice for ten months, at which time plaintiffs received satisfaction of their judgment.
The mandamus action was then dismissed.
196. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6701, 1610, 12 U.S.C. § 248 (2002).
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suggestion of help from State and Treasury- access to the frozen assets for
purposes of satisfaction of judgments. 197 Even after that statutory enactment, the
combined resistance of State and Treasury was only overcome by the Executive
Order of the President. 98 That Order confiscated all frozen assets of the Republic
of Iraq, over 2 billion m U.S. dollars, except for assets previously located by
judgment creditors, accomplished in three cases without the aid of State and
Treasury, and subject to levy or writ. 199 Had Iraq been afforded due process, the
Dalibertiplaintiffs and plaintiffs in two other cases could not have been paid. The
confiscation of Iraq's frozen assets by Executive Order would in and of itself have
been a denial of due process.
The same Court of Appeals earlier had said: "No one would suppose that a
foreign national had a due process right to notice and a hearing before the
Executive imposed an embargo on it for the purpose of coercing a change in
policy ,200
IS INTERNATIONAL SHOE IN DANGER OF LOSING ITS EFFECT9

Judges and lawyers should not construe the Price II case to mean the end of
InternationalShoe's requirement of mimmum contacts so that the maintenance of
a suit does not offend the traditional notions of fair play and justice. The Price I
court specifically left open the prospect that entities other than a specific
government of a foreign sovereign might still be considered persons for purposes
of due process.20 1 Consistent with this specific reservation by the Price 11 court,
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York in post-judgment
proceedings in Dalibertiallowed bank accounts of the government of Iraq, frozen
by Executive Order,20 2 to be disbursed forthwith to satisfy the Daliberti and
Frazier judgments, while requiring specific notice, translated into Arabic, and
thirty days opportunity within which to come into such court and be heard by
20 3
subsidiary corporations which were wholly owned by the Republic of Iraq.
197. See id
198. Exec. Order No. 13,290, 68 Fed. Reg. 14,307 (Mar. 20, 2003).
199. Id.
200. Price17, 294 F.3d at 99 (citing People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 182 F.3d 17,
22 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
201. Price II, 294 F.3d at 99-100.
202. Exec. Order No. 12,724, 55 Fed. Reg. 33,089 (Aug. 9, 1990). President Bush's Executive
Order No. 12,724 included the agencies, instrumentalities, controlled interests and the Central Bank of

Iraq.
203. The District Court in post-judgment proceedings in Daliberti v. Iraq and Frazier v. Iraq
required thirty day notice in Arabic, with the opportunity to be heard, for the Central Bank of Iraq,

Bank Rashid and Raffidan Bank, all wholly owned and operated agencies of the Republic of Iraq. Judge
Spnzzo's Order for providing notice to the banks which were wholly owned by the Republic of Iraq

provided alternative means of notice as follows:
(a) [B]y delivery by U.S. Global Express Mail, together with the Cover
Memorandum. .initiated by the Clerk of the Court and by JPM Chase and Bank of New
York. with proof of delivery to be provided with the procedures established for U.S.
Global Express Mail; (b) by delivery by any other mail or courier service. that will
provide either proof or acknowledgment of delivery; (c) by delivery to the Permanent
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While not specifically expressing the issue of due process, the Court m those
proceedings clearly set forth a procedure of its own design which would
undoubtedly have been held to amount to due process for the Iraqi subsidiaries
whose assets were subject to levy and execution. The Price II court left open the
Bank m the Daliberti
possibility that a subsidiary corporation, such as Rafidain
20 4
case, might require treatment affording due process.
The Price II court finally reiterated the availability of forum non conveniens
not withstanding the unavailability of due process for foreign sovereigns, thus
mitigating the concern that "United States courts will become the courts of choice
sovereign defendants and
for local disputes between foreign plaintiffs and foreign
20 5
thus be reduced to international courts of clains."
Given the possible exceptions to the opinion which the court left available m
Price II, it is unlikely that InternationalShoe, and the rule regarding minimum
contacts, will fade away Conversely, if a designated terrorist sovereign mistreats
U.S. citizens in a manner which fulfills the criteria of the FSIA that such treatment
amounts to having a direct effect in the United States, notwithstanding the fact that
the contacts occur outside the United States, minimum contacts should not be an
issue. InternationalShoe still has many miles to travel.

Mission of Iraq to the United Nations and to the Iraq Interest Section of the Algerian
Embassy to the United States with instructions for transshipment of same to the Iraqi
bank; (d) by delivery to any agent appointed for service of process or to any other person
designated by the Iraqi Banks to receive notification with respect to any activity in their
accounts within or outside the United States in connection with accounts maintained in
New York, or identified in agreements entered into with JPM Chase or BNY by any of
the Iraqi Banks; (e) by delivery to the branch of Rafidain Bank located in Amman,
Jordan; (1) by delivery to the branch of Rafidain Bank located in Amman, Jordan, with
instructions for transshipment of same to the Iraqi Banks' head offices in Baghdad, Iraq,
as per BNY's arrangement with Rafidan Bank for delivery of periodic account
statements to the Central Bank of Iraq, Bank Rafidan or Bank Rashead; and, (g) by
electronic delivery (including fax, e-mail and/or telex) to the Iraqi Banks
Judge Spnzo's Order, In re Daliberti v. J.P Morgan Chase & Co., et al., Cause No. 2002 CV 9778 rn
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. After service of such notice but
before the thirty days had expired, the Executive Order carved out an exception to the President's
confiscation of all of Iraq's frozen assets which was applicable only to Daliberii v. Republic of Iraq,
Frazierv. Republic of Iraq and Dadesho v. Government of Iraq. Exec. Order No. 13290: Confiscating
& Vesting Certain Iraqi Property, March 20,2003.
with the issue directly before us, we hold that foreign
204. Price11, 294 F.3d at 96 (noting that
states are not 'persons' protected by the Fifth Amendment").
205. The Price II court, after noting the remaining availability of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, concluded: "the forum non conveniens doctrine helps mitigate the concern that 'United
States courts will become the courts of choice for local disputes between foreign plaintiffs and foreign
sovereign defendants and thus be reduced to international courts of claims."' Id. at 100 (quoting
Proyecfin de Venezuela, S.A. v. Banco Industrial de Venezuela, S.A., 760 F.2d 390, 394 (2d Cir.
1985)).

